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We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.'
ABSTRACT
"We the People." That phrase conjures a vision of present-day
U.S. citizens taking part of a continuous enterprise of constitutional
development, each succeeding generation stepping into the shoes of
those who framed and ratified the Constitution and, as the new per-
former in the role of "We the People," reinterpreting a centuries-old
role. Like those who created the role, we have power to modify the
Constitution. But is each succeeding generation really allowed the
same creative and expressive power to alter the role, to amend the
Constitution?
The subject of this Article, in general, is the relationship between
"We the People," who "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]" the Constitu-
tion, and we the "Posterity" to whom the "Blessings of Liberty" were
to be secured. The rules for amending the Constitution, and any limi-
tation on amendment emplaced by those rules, are central to relation-
ships between generations of the American citizenry. The more
particular topic of this Article is the special case of unamendable pro-
visions as ties that bind and the gaps that separate generations of We
the People. Such permanent, unalterable provisions are the ties that
bind generations inflexibly to one another; yet such provisions create
the widest of gaps between the sovereignties of those same
generations.2
1. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2. As to intergenerational relationships among the citizenry, and the possibility of
unamendable provisions, Akhil Reed Amar has written:
[O]ne might plausibly infer from the Preamble's text about the rights of "our Posterity"
and from the very act of ordainment that what We, the People originally established,
We could later amend. Ongoing popular sovereignty formed the Constitution's bed-
rock principle, which could not be abrogated without undermining the very foundation
of the document. On this view, if some putative amendment purported to eliminate the
right of a later generation to adopt still further amendments, such an attempted abroga-
tion of a genuinely inalienable right would not be a permissible amendment of the Con-
stitution's general project. Rather, it would represent an impermissible repudiation of
the basic legitimating concept.
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 292 (2005).
Amar assumes an inalienable power of popular sovereignty prevents the United States citi-
zenry from ever truly binding itself. In this way, Amar sees in the Preamble an assumed oneness
of the American people over time. The "We" that "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]" the Constitu-
[voL. 60:483484
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INTRODUCTION
The current citizenry of the United States lives with the Constitu-
tion given to us by past generations. The supermajority requirements
for constitutional amendment' effectively grant the decisions of past
generations a deference, a presumption that must be overcome if the
Constitution is to be changed. Future generations, likewise, will need
to coalesce into an amendatory supermajority to alter the Constitution
we leave to them.
A similar situation exists in most national constitutions.' The def-
erence conferred upon the past by supermajority amendment require-
ments can raise concerns about the self-determination of present
democratic majorities.6 And some constitutions have set aside certain
provisions as subject to amendment only when even more stringent
requirements are met.'
tion and the "We" that amend it are the same, or at least the framing and following generations
have the same power to create constitutional provisions. As this Article makes clear, I take a
different lesson from the Preamble. It contains "We the People" and "[their] Posterity." When
we look at the framing generation, they are the People. We are the posterity. Significant results
flow from that distinction.
3. See U.S. CONsT. art. V (requiring, for amendments to be valid, that they be proposed by
two-thirds of both houses of Congress, or by a constitutional convention, then ratified by legisla-
tures or ratifying conventions of three-fourths of the states).
4. Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 387 (1997) [hereinafter Klar-
man, Antifidelity] ("Supermajority requirements [for constitutional amendment] necessarily
privilege the status quo; they are antimajoritarian and difficult to reconcile with democratic
premises.").
5. Amendment rules for contemporary constitutions across the world predominantly re-
quire multiple levels of approval, usually by supermajorities of the legislature and/or the people
and/or "a complex extra-majoritarian decision rule." Lael K. Weis, Constitutional Amendment
Rules and Interpretive Fidelity to Democracy, 38 MELB. U. L. REV. 240, 265 (2014).
6. See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1632
(2009) (asking "[w]hat entitles one generation of Americans to entrench against simple
majoritarian change those values and practices it deems fundamental, but that a later generation
may find unnecessary or affirmatively retrograde?")
Likewise:
What gave men in the late eighteenth century, who lived in a world vastly different
from our own, the right to impose their preferences on all future generations of Ameri-
cans, unless those later generations could meet the supermajority requirements that the
founding generation prescribed for constitutional amendments in Article V? For those
generations that do manage to amend the Constitution, what gives them the right to
bind future majorities until a supermajority can again be assembled?
Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be
Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 320 (2008).
7. Weis, supra note 5, at 263 (noting it is common for countries to have different amend-
ment procedures, more and less onerous, depending on the subject matter of the amendment);
see also Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13 INr'L. J. CONsT. L. 655,




So, the point of this Article: what of the intergenerational diffi-
culties created when some constitutional provisions cannot be
amended'-when, under the terms of the constitution, no
supermajority is sufficient to overcome the status quo?9
In another place, I have argued that the U.S. Constitution con-
tained in its original form, and to this day, a permanently unamend-
able provision.10 I also argued that there exists today the power of an
amendatory supermajority to create additional unamendable provi-
sions. I admit I find this second result disquieting and, given my un-
certainty as to that part of my result," I have returned to the question
with a view to understanding why that result is such a troubling idea,
and does an exploration of it reduce or increase that unease?
Such unamendable provisions have been decried as undermining
the rights of later citizens "to adequate and equal opportunities for
participating in public debate, voting equality, informed citizenship ...
deliberative procedures, [and] effective representation."'2 And surely
8. There is always the option of extra-constitutional change; revolution, if you like, or the
potentially less violent event of tearing up a constitution and writing a new one. In either situa-
tion, such a "re-constitution" is a question of power and will rather than constitutional law. My
concerns in this Article are bounded by what is legally allowable under a constitution, not ex-
traconstitutional change. See Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Con-
stitution, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13,
30 (Andrds Koltay ed., Wolters Kluwer 2015) [hereinafter Albert, Unamendable] (recognizing
that "[u]namendability, whether formal or informal, is defenceless against any effort to create a
new constitutional regime[,] [b]ut unamendability can be enforced within an existing, legally
continuous regime where political actors operate by the textual rules of legal change").
9. Such unamendable provisions existed in 82 of 192 national constitutions in 2011. Yaniv
Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments-The Migration and Success of a Constitu-
tional Idea, 61 AM. J. Comp. L. 657, 667 (2013). "[T]he global trend, especially after World War
II, is towards acceptance of explicit and implicit limitations on the constitutional amendment
power." GAbor Halmai, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments and New Constitutions in
Comparative Perspective, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 951, 982-83 (2015); see Richard Albert,
Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1038 nn.53-57,
1040 nn.67-68 (2014) [hereinafter Albert, Constitutional Disuse] (listing briefly and categorizing
over 20 national constitutions containing unamendable provisions); Richard Albert, Countercon-
stitutionalism, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 1, 39-44 (2008) [hereinafter Albert, Counterconstitutionalism]
(describing unamendable provisions in the constitutions of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Namibia,
Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger).
10. That argument appears in George Mader, Binding Authority: Unamendability in the
United States Constitution-A Textual and Historical Analysis, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 841 (2016). A
brief summary of the core of the argument appears infra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
The unamendable constitutional provision is: "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Quali-
fication to any Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
11. I hold to my argument that the original U.S. Constitution contained unamendable pro-
visions, one of which is permanent and is still in force. As to the issue of whether we may create
unamendable provisions, I still prefer over any opposing view my argument that we have that
power; but I am open to being persuaded otherwise.
12. Albert, Unamendable, supra note 8, at 23; see also Douglas Linder, What in the Constitu-
tion Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 717, 728-32 (1981) (arguing unamendable amend-
[VOL. 60:483486
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there are dangers in unamendable provisions. A constitutional
supermajority may make a tragically unwise choice, perhaps an
overhasty action undertaken during short-term passion or a decision
made during the benightedness of a present compared to a possibly
more enlightened future." Thus, one argument against a constitution
containing or allowing unamendable provisions is an assumed pro-
gress by succeeding generations, a belief in not only the right of suc-
ceeding generations of citizens to amend a constitution however they
please, but also a trust in the likelihood that they will correct our er-
rors or oversights.
And yet, do we not have the power to unalterably bind ourselves
to live by an ideal, to hold ourselves to a standard? "Do we not be-
lieve that we can agree today to bind ourselves tomorrow, and, fur-
ther, that we can agree today that we shall not have the right
tomorrow to change our minds?"14
In this Article, I explore the concerns raised by the possibility of
unamendable constitutional provisions and address three topics: (1) If
the framers created unamendable provisions but no later generation
can create them, what does it say about our constitutional heritage;
what does it say about "We the People"? (2) If we can create
unamendable provisions, should we amend the Constitution so such
provisions are no longer possible, neither for us nor future genera-
tions? (3) If we can create unamendable provisions, with what mind-
set and under what precautions should we exercise that power?
The answers I reach are:
(1) If our generation has no power to create unamendable provi-
sions, then we must confront this truth: the generation that framed
and ratified the original Constitution is the one and only true "We
the People." That was a generation apart, the last with the power to
say the Constitution stands permanently for any substantive pro-
position. All following generations are in a subordinate position. In
ments are invalid because they are inconsistent with democratic theory and morality and they
allow one generation to prevent succeeding generations from making fundamental political and
moral choices).
13. Miriam Galston, Theocracy in America: Should Core First Amendment Values Be Per-
manent?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 65, 116 ("The central policy argument against entrenching
parts of the Constitution is that doing so would subject the country to the risk of unamendable
provisions in circumstances when they should be altered to accommodate social, economic, polit-
ical, or cultural changes.").
14. David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 117,
122 (Sanford Levinson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1995). Dow argues that the essence of the
United States Constitution is the paradox that the citizenry believes in both majority will and
that "certain ideals transcend the vicissitudes of majority will." Id. at 143-44.
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addition, the Constitution is merely an adaptable framework'5 for
achieving whatever stream of preferences moves an amendatory
supermajority of the people of the United States at a given time.16
(2) If, in the alternative, we can create unamendable provisions, we
may remove that power, but we should not. Banning such provi-
sions forever by constitutional amendment would unfairly restrict
future generations as surely as any other unamendable provision.
We would not be declaring a particular substantive provision
unamendable, but would be prohibiting an entire class of provisions.
We and the future both may need at some point an ability to disable
ourselves in a believable way from certain alterations to the Consti-
tution. There is a danger that the power to create unamendable
provisions may be misused, but perhaps we should trust the future a
little.
(3) If we consider creating unamendable provisions of our own, we
must develop processes that filter out provisions that indulge the
self-interest of the present to the detriment of future generations'
sovereignty over their own times. Such processes might include re-
quiring multiple ratifications over time to ensure intergenerational
acquiescence. In addition, certain long-standing, long-approved
constitutional provisions declaring protective rights might safely be
made unamendable.
Part I of this Article is a necessary evil-it examines in dry, logi-
cal terms the possible basic constitutional postures a constitution may
adopt toward unamendability, then offers instinctive reactions to the
intergenerational fairness of each type. Part I also briefly recapitu-
lates my argument that the United States Constitution contains an
unamendable provision and allows, through the Article V amendment
process, the creation of other unamendable provsions. Part II ex-
plores the literature on constitutional precommitment and the man-
ners in which preommitment by one generation binds later
generations. I then take lessons learned from that literature (which
usually addresses the case in which constitutional amendment is diffi-
15. I do not mean to imply an adaptable framework that provides governmental stability is
less than an ingenious creation. My use of "merely" is to drive home the point that although
many Americans see the Constitution as containing permanent ruths and ideals, if the Constitu-
tion is infinitely amendable, the only permanent truth or ideal it can stand for is its own
flexibility.
16. Any preference, that is, except a desire to add a provision permanently to the Constitu-
tion. To be sure, one might reply, perhaps devastatingly, that what I just so blithely referred to
as "achieving whatever stream of preferences moves ... the people" might neatly be summed up
in a single word: "liberty" (the blessings of which are secured to the framers' posterity). But it is
a particular brand of liberty that does not allow Constitution-enforced self-binding.
[VOL. 60:483488
Generation Gaps and Ties That Bind
cult, not impossible) and apply them to the case of unamendable con-
stitutional provisions. Part III includes a reflection on whether each
generation is allowed to have a "voice" in the Constitution, and also
discusses what sorts of constitutional provisions might best be made
unamendable, including the case in which an unamendable provision
prohibits all future unamendable provisions.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL UNAMENDABILITY
A constitution, when it first takes effect, can adopt one of two
stances on each of two questions about unamendability. Every consti-
tution either contains an unamendable provision" or does not contain
an unamendable provision. Also, every constitution either perma-
nently prohibits the later creation of unamendable provisions, or it
does not permanently prohibit the later creation of unamendable pro-
visions. Thus, there are four categories of constitutions, correspond-
ing to the boxes in Table 1, below.






Yes Has at least one Has at least one
unamendable provision unamendable provision
but permanently and does not
Contains at Least prohibits creation of permanently prohibit
One Unamendable any more creation of more
Provision?
2 4
No Has no unamendable Has no unamendable
provision and provisions and does not
permanently prohibits permanently prohibit
creation of any more creation of more
Table 1: Conditions of Unamendability When Constitution First Takes
Effect
17. To allow for the idea that there can be, outside the text of a constitution, implicit consti-




A. Two Observations About Unamendability
With the preceding as introduction, and with the table as a help-
ful organizing scheme, we can observe two truths about constitutions
and unamendable provisions. These observations are useful back-
ground for the rest of the article.
Observation No. 1 Every constitution, when it first takes effect,
either allows the eventual creation of unamend-
able provisions or already includes unamendable
provisions, or both. An equivalent statement is
that Box 2, which purports to be the case in
which the original constitution neither contains
any unamendable provisions nor allows their
later creation, is empty.
Proof: If a constitution can never have any unamend-
able provisions, there must be a provision of the
constitution prohibiting unamendable provi-
sions.'s That provision is itself either unamend-
able or not. If it is unamendable, then
Observation No. 1 is true. So, assume to the con-
trary that the provision prohibiting unamendable
provisions is open to amendment. Then it can be
removed from the constitution, the constitution
will then allow unamendable provisions, and the
observation above is true.
As seen within the proof, the only way for a constitution to pro-
hibit forever the creation of unamendable provisions is for it to al-
ready have (or add) an unamendable provision barring unamendable
provisions.'9 So it must be the case that every constitution has, or
18. I am allowing the instance in which the provision barring the creation of unamendable
provisions is an implicit understanding about the constitution.
19. Richard Albert has said something similar, though more particular: "the exception to
the general rule against unamendability in the United States presents itself: the First Amend-
ment's democratic rights must themselves be unamendable in order to preserve the free amenda-
bility of the United States Constitution." Albert, Unamendable, supra note 8, at 31. Albert sees
the United States Constitution as possessing no unamendable textual provisions, clearly a point
on which he and I disagree. Id. at 24; see also AMAR, supra note 2, at 291 (wondering whether
"some things [are] unamendable by dint of the Constitution's very essence[.] For example,
[does] the bedrock idea of republican self-government mean that strong protection for core po-
litical expression [is] an irrepealable feature of the entire constitutional project?"). I consider
[VOL. 60:483490
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eventually can have, one or more unamendable provisions. The ques-
tion is not whether the constitution has/allows unamendability, but
rather what kind of unamendability it has and/or allows: will it have an
unamendable provision that forever bars all other permanent provi-
sions or will it be open to the creation of unamendable provisions?2 0
Observation No. 2 A constitution that permanently prohibits the
creation of unamendable provisions cannot
regain the power to create unamendable provi-
sions, but a constitution that allows the creation
of unamendable provisions can be altered to give
up that power.21
the First Amendment to be neither implicitly nor explicitly unamendable. See Mader, supra note
10, at 879-81.
20. Note that, whether there is a provision barring future unamendable provisions or not,
there may be (other) unamendable provisions already present in the constitution.
21. A metaphor often mentioned in discussing the issues surrounding unamendability is the
paradox of the omnipotent being and the boulder: can an omnipotent being create a boulder an
omnipotent being cannot lift? See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 2, at 292; JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UN-
BOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 147-48 (2000) [herein-
after ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND]; PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A
STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE, at xiii-xiv (1990). No matter the answer,
the posited omnipotent being fails at a task and is therefore not omnipotent. Either the being
can lift every boulder it can create, and therefore lack "creative omnipotence" or it can create a
boulder it cannot lift, and therefore lack "lifting omnipotence." The comparison is then made
the amending power: either it can create an unamendable provision (and will thereafter lack
"alteration omnipotence" in that it is unable to alter every aspect of the constitution) or it is able
to amend every aspect of the constitution (and therefore lack "binding omnipotence" in that it
cannot create a binding provision incapable of amendment). Thus, an "omnipotent" amending
power is labeled a paradox.
There is, however, a problem with the analogy between the boulder-creating omnipotent
being and a provision-creating amending power: In the boulder-creation and boulder-lifting par-
adox, the omnipotent being is not itself changed; the boulder is not a part of the being. But
when an amending power creates an unamendable provision, that act affects the amending
power, which is lessened by the fact that there is not something it cannot amend.
The better analogy is this: Recognize that one aspect of an omnipotent being is the ability to
change any aspect of itself. So we request the omnipotent being alter itself by giving up its
omnipotence. The being either will be able to give up its omnipotence (at which point it is no
longer omnipotent), or it will be unable to give up its omnipotence. It might seem we again have
a paradox-the being fails in either case, as it either no longer is omnipotent or it has failed at a
task (and is therefore not omnipotent). But it only seems a paradox if we assume omnipotence
is eternal. When the omnipotent being is asked to change itself to lose its omnipotence, the
being has succeeded (displays omnipotence) at that moment only if it loses omnipotence. If the
being does not lose omnipotence, the being was not omnipotent in the first place. That the being
is no longer omnipotent at time t2 is not a concern as to the being's omnipotence at time t,.
Observation No. 2 above encapsulates this result. Non-omnipotent amending powers can-
not create unamendable provisions. Omnipotent amending powers can create unamendable
provisions, thereby forever losing their omnipotence.
2017] 491
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Proof: The first part of the observation is simply an
acknowledgment of what it means for a provision
to be unamendable.
As to the second part of the observation: If a
constitution allows the creation of unamendable
provisions, then one unamendable provision that
can be created is:
Article Z: This Article is unamendable. No
amendment to the constitution made after the rati-
fication of this Article shall result in an unamend-
able constitutional provision.
Such an amendment would bar any future unamendable
provisions.
Put into the terms of Table 1, Observation No. 2 means it is possi-
ble for a constitution to move from Box 3 or Box 4 (the Boxes in
which unamendable provisions may be eventually created) to Box 1
by creating an unamendable provision that bans any future unamend-
able provisions. The reverse movement, Box 1 to Box 3 or Box 4, is
not possible.
Before moving on to an elucidation of unamendability in the
United States Constitution, it is worthwhile to gauge, in a simple, intu-
itive way, the manner in which constitutions falling into each Box
treat the constitutional aspirations of later generations.
In Box 1 of Table 1, the constitutional framers have created one
or more provisions that cannot be amended and, further, have prohib-
ited the creation of any future permanent provisions. Box 1 can be
further subdivided into two cases.
[VOL. 60:483492
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Box 1 Criterion Case A Case B
The sole unamendable provi- There are multiple unamend-
sion is one prohibiting all able provisions, including one
Constitution has future unamendable provi- that prohibits the addition of
at least one sions (the constitution can any other, future unamend-
unamendable pro- never have any other un- able provisions
vision but perma- amendable provision)
nently prohibits Relationship between consti- Relationship between consti-
creation of any tutional framers and future: tutional framers and future:
more Framers bind future only in Framers place unamendable
that there will be no un- restrictions on future citizens
amendable provisions, a con- but do not allow future citi-
dition under which the fram- zens to create additional
ers also place themselves unamendable provisions
Table 2: The two cases of Box 1 Constitutions.
In Case A, the sole unamendable provision at the time the consti-
tution goes into effect is a provision banning any future unamendable
provisions. The constitution's framers have determined every aspect
of the constitution shall be open to amendment forever. This power
of the framing generation to decide for all future generations the issue
of whether unamendable provisions shall be possible is inherent in the
one-way direction of time. The framing generation was required to
foreclose or allow unamendability; what they did affected their future,
our presenta.2 2 But apart from the framers deciding to ban unamend-
able provisions, the framers and all future generations are treated the
same. 
2 3
22. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitu-
tional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 427-28 (2003) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rap-
paport, Symmetric] (acknowledging that a framing generation has more power than succeeding
generations in that they could decide the strictness of the ntrenchment rules that would apply to
both the framers and to succeeding generations of citizens). Such a "first-mover" advantage is
unavoidable, though, and is mitigated as much as possible if the framing generation subjects
itself to the same rules it imposes on future generations. Id.; see also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND
TH-E SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 94 (1979) [hereinafter ELSTER, SI-
RENS] ("The constituent assembly has a unique and privileged character, not by right but by
historical accident. Tn exceptional and unpredictable historical situations, representivity of per-
sons and the legitimacy of voting methods are decided on the spot; the drastic breach with the
past leaves the assembly free to bind the future."); infra note 100 and accompanying text.
23. It is not true that a permanently unamendable provision was the only way for the fram-
ers to prohibit themselves from creating unamendable provisions. They could have made the bar
to unamendability temporary, thereby restraining only themselves and the citizenry who fol-
lowed shortly.
Also note that, although it is true that unamendability has been prohibited forever, there is
nothing preventing the citizenry from creating onerous amendment procedures that make future
amendments extremely difficult.
22. Se4onO9cins3 ihe .RpaorSmercEtenhet osiu
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In Case B, there are multiple unamendable provisions, including
a final one that prevents any future creation of permanent provisions.
In this case, the constitution's framers have created permanent provi-
sions, then prohibited the practice to later generations. The framers
have had the final say on some topics, then prohibited all future gen-
erations not only from changing the framers' decisions on those topics,
but from having their own final say on any other topics. All future
generations are treated the same as one another, but here the framers
have treated themselves differently in a manner beyond the unavoida-
ble first-mover advantage.
In Box 3 of Table 1, the constitution's framers have made deci-
sions that cannot be undone or altered, but the framers also have al-
lowed following generations to do as the framers did-to create
unamendable provisions. There is still a certain unfair asymmetry in
that the framers act first, putting some amendments beyond the power
of future generations, whereas the future generations of course put no
powers out of reach of the framers. Each successive generation can
add unamendable provisions, so the framing generation has created a
situation in which there could be a hierarchy of generations, later gen-
erations receiving less power to amend than earlier generations. As
noted earlier, the creation of a particular kind of amendment, one bar-
ring all future unamendable provisions, would move a constitution
from Box 3 to Box 1.
In Box 4 of Table 1, the framers have deferred to future genera-
tions the entire question of unamendability. The framers have im-
posed no constraints on future generations, who may or may not
create unamendable provisions, and may or may not (one time, by one
generation) prohibit all future unamendable provisions. The creation
of an unamendable provision (allowed in this Box) would, of course,
move the constitution from Box 4 to Box 3,24 or, if the unamendable
provision barred all future unamendable provisions, to Box 1.
B. Unamendability in the U.S. Constitution
Below is a greatly condensed version of my argument, made else-
where,2 5 that the original U.S. Constitution in 1789 contained two
unamendable provisions, one of which was temporary, and one of
24. The opposite move, from Box 3 to Box 4, is not possible.
25. The text contains only the barest outline of my argument. For the full, (and I think far
more convincing) argument, please see Mader, supra note 10.
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which still exists. I further argued that constitutional text and histori-
cal evidence from the framing period indicate that the Constitution
allows the creation of other unamendable provisions, thus placing it in
Box 3 of Table 1.
We can begin by noting the U.S. Constitution contains no explicit
statements about allowing or not allowing amendments containing
26unamendable provisions.
My argument starts with the language of Article V:
[Amendments proposed by two-thirds of both houses of Congress,
or by a constitutional convention] shall be valid to all Intents and
purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by [legislatures
or ratifying conventions] of three fourths of the several States, .. ;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to [1808]
shall in any Manner affect [Article I, Section 9, clauses 1 and 4]; and
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.27
The first portion of Article V's concluding proviso, a so-called
sunset provision, made certain aspects of the Constitution2 8 unamend-
able until 1808. It also was itself unamendable until 1808. One might
attempt to argue the provision is ineffective by saying Article V could
have been amended prior to 1808 to remove the prohibition on
amendment, and then another amendment could have been enacted
that "affect[ed]" the provisions previously protected. But an amend-
ment of Article V removing the protective sunset provision would it-
self "in any Manner affect" the clauses protected from amendment.2 9
Various contemporaneous understandings of the word "affect" as
used in Article V support that conclusion.3 0 Thus, the sunset en-
trenchment provision in Article V was unamendable until 1808, as
were the specifically cited clauses from Article I, Section 9, and all
26. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Symmetric, supra note 22, at 411, 429-30 (stating the au-
thors' understanding that Article V of the United States Constitution permits the creation of
unamendable amendments, but deeming that situation a "definite flaw").
27. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
28. The specific clauses referenced in the sunset provision are:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the states now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to [1808], but a Tax
or duty may be imposed on each such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.
Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
29. See Mader, supra note 10, at 855-64.
30. Id. at 860-64.
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provisions whose alteration would have "affect[ed]" those clauses.
This prohibition on amendment included, for example, the Three-
Fifths Clause, as it "affect[ed]" Article I, Section 9, clause 4.3132
Article VI of the Constitution contains a provision that is
unamendable.33  Article VI includes: "no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States."3 4 This is the only instance of the word "ever" (or any
word of such temporal illimitability) appearing in the Constitution.
The best understanding of the phrase "no religious Test . . . ever" is
that it prohibits not only religious tests, but also prohibits the removal
of the prohibition on religious tests. The provision would bar religious
tests even without the word "ever." It simply is not plausible that the
only use in the Constitution of a word of permanence is a surplusage.
To prevent "ever" from being extraneous, it must be that the word
connotes permanence of the provision; the provision states not merely
"no religious test," but "no religious test ever." There is also historical
evidence that (1) this provision prohibiting religious tests was under-
stood at the time to be unamendable, and (2) the Framers wanted the
provision to be unamendable.s
Given the precedent of multiple unamendable provisions in the
original Constitution, one of which is permanent, and given Article
V's provision that any amendments properly proposed and ratified are
"valid to all Intents and Purposes as Part of this Constitution," new
amendments to the Constitution can create unamendable provisions.
31. The Three-Fifths Clause states in relevant part: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall
be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three fifths of all other Persons." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
32. For completeness's ake, allow me to address the other entrenchment provision in Arti-
cle V of the Constitution. The provision that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of
its equal Suffrage in the Senate" is ingeniously constructed to prevent changes to the states'
equal vote in the Senate, but is not unamendable. The consent requirement could be removed
first by ordinary amendment (with no particular state's consent being necessary, as removing the
provision would not deprive any state of its equal Senate vote). Then, with the consent require-
ment removed, a state could be deprived of its equal vote. The provision is unamendable as a
practical matter, however, until such time as all states desire a different rule of suffrage in the
Senate. This is because if the provision is removed, every state is susceptible to an amendment
aimed at reducing that state's Senate representation. The provision is a pin in a grenade, and to
pull it puts every state's own interest in danger. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
33. Mader, supra note 10, at 870-78.
34. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
35. Despite the presence of religious tests in almost all the states, there was little discussion
of the provision at the Constitutional Convention; much of the historical evidence referred to in
the text is aimed at explaining that lack of discussion. Mader, supra note 10, at 873-78.
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We also have historical evidence that post-framing statesmen believed
they had the power to create unamendable provisions. Constitutional
amendments that would create unamendable provisions have, in fact,
been proposed. Most significantly, as the Civil War approached in the
winter of 1860-61, several amendment proposals aimed at resolving
that crisis contained purportedly unamendable provisions.6 One of
those proposals unquestionably intended to be unamendable, the
Corwin Amendment Proposal of 1861,"3 was passed by two-thirds of
each house of Congress and sent to the states for ratification (one of
only six amendment proposals to clear both houses of Congress and
fail to be ratified"). President Lincoln acknowledged in his first inau-
gural address that such an irrevocable provision was acceptable.3 9
The proposal was ratified by two states before events overtook its
war-averting goal.
So my argument as to the constitutionality of creating unamend-
able provisions by amendment is, in sum, that the framers appreciated
the logical and textual nuances of unamendability, and chose to place
36. Perhaps chief among the many proposals were a set of six proposals by Senator Crit-
tenden of Kentucky, the so-called Crittenden Proposals, which contained unamendable provi-
sions. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1861); see also Mader, supra note 10, 885-87
(discussing the Crittenden Proposals).
37. The proposed amendment read:
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Con-
gress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions
thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said state.
Corwin Amendment, proposed for U.S. CONsT. art. XIII (proposed Mar. 2, 1861); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1236 (1861).
The drafting of this provision was flawed, resulting in a provision that was intended to be
unamendable but would have been amendable. See Mader, supra note 10, at 886-89.
38. The five other amendment proposals sent to the states for ratification but were not
ratified are: (1) from the original list of amendment proposals that became the Bill of Rights, a
proposal prescribing the size and representation standards for the House of Representatives
(those standards are currently met); (2) a proposal from the early republic to require congres-
sional permission for any U.S. citizen to accept a noble title or other boon from a foreign power;
(3) one that would allow Congress to regulate the working conditions of minors, a power now
considered to reside in the Commerce Clause; (4) the Equal Rights Amendment; and (5) an
amendment granting congressional representation to Washington D.C. For a brief history of
these unratified amendment proposals and their texts, see STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, 99TH CONG., AMEND. TO THE CONST.: A BRIEF LEGIs. HIsT. 96-98 (Comm. Print 1985); see
also JoHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS, AND LEGISLA-
TIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACrIoNS 24-25 (1994).
39. "I understand a proposed amendment o the Constitution ... has passed [Congress,] to
the effect that the federal government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the
States, including that of persons held to service.... [H]olding such a provision to now be im-
plied [by] Constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable."




two unamendable provisions into the Constitution. The framers also
provided for amendments to the Constitution, but did not include a
textual bar to additional unamendable provisions. Historical events
show that when faced with the Civil War crisis, Congress and the Pres-
ident both assumed unamendable provisions could be proposed and
ratified into the Constitution. So, given the Framers' creation of
unamendable provisions and Article V's assurance amendments are
"Part of this Constitution," I infer that later generations have the
power to create unamendable constitutional provisions.
One certainly can take issue with that inference, but such an ar-
gument would need to posit that amendments are limited to refine-
ments to the original Constitution, that they must conform to some
degree with the Constitution as a whole.40 In my earlier work, I ad-
dressed such arguments but did not fully resolve them.4 1
The result, then, is that the U.S. Constitution is in Box 3 of Table
1, or, perhaps, Box 1B of Table 2 (if one believes an unwritten consti-
tutional provision bars us from creating unamendable provisions).
Box 1B indicates the framing generation had more constitutional
power than any succeeding generation-the Framers included
40. See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88
MICH. L. REv. 239, 300-01 (1989) (arguing the Framers intended a permanent constitution and
considered amendments to be the means of perfecting the document, if necessary, by eliminating
defects rather than considering amendments to be adaptations to changed circumstances);
Roznai, supra note 9, at 670 (reprising the argument made in the first Congress that amendments
were based on a different authority (the states) from that on which the Constitution is based (the
people)); Justin DuPratt White, Is There an Eighteenth Amendment?, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 113, 116
(1920) (declaring as a limit: "whether or not the subject of [the proposed amendment] is of a
class that, followed to the end by subsequent amendments, would result in the destruction of the
United States or of the states"); R. George Wright, Could a Constitutional Amendment be Un-
constitutional?, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 741, 764 (1991) (finding, "for reasons of logic," amend-
ments to be unconstitutional if they are incompatible with the assumed remainder of the
Constitution); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 182-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaak
Kramnick ed., 1987) (forming the basis for an argument that amendments are founded on a
different, and perhaps lesser, authority because they are not of a whole with the rest of the
Constitution):
We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation,
very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those who
form a majority on one question, may become the minority on a second, and an associa-
tion dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of
moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a
manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense multi-
plication of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act....
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single pro-
position .... There would be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation
to any other point-no giving nor taking.
41. Mader, supra note 10, at 882-84. As I noted in the Introduction to this Article, this
incomplete resolution, as well as my unease with the result that unamendable provisions may be
added to the Constitution, led me to write this Article.
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unamendable provisions, but no later generation has that option. If
the U.S. Constitution is located in Box 3, the Framers created provi-
sions we cannot undo and we have additional questions to consider:
What are the dangers and benefits of unamendable provisions; should
we create any of them; and how do we go about creating such provi-
sions in a manner likely to maximize benefits while minimizing dan-
gers? The following section addresses those concerns.
II. THE TIES THAT BIND: INTERGENERATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS
A key concern of constitutional theorists is the tension between
democratic principles of majority rule and a constitution containing
provisions entrenched against alteration by a mere majority.4 2 The
scholarship in this area mostly addresses supermajority requirements
that make constitutional amendment difficult rather than addressing
unamendability, but the two situations are to a degree analogous, and
many of the concepts that arise transfer usefully from the first situa-
tion to the second.
42. See, e.g., ELSTER, SIRENS, supra note 22, at 93 ("The paradox of democracy can thus be
expressed: each generation wants to be free to bind its successors, while not being bound by its
predecessors."); ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 21, at 88-94; STEPHEN HOLMES, PAS-
SIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134-77 (1995) [hereinafter
HOLMES, PASSION AND CONSTRAINTS]; Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic
Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1992 (2003) ("[I]f the effect of constitutions is to impose constraints not so
much on the founding generation, . . . but on subsequent generations, may that be reconciled
with any robust majoritarian sense of democracy?"); id. at 1994 ("Why must the generation of
today be bound in its majoritarian desires simply because the society of yesterday insistently
demanded that certain political avenues be closed?"); Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 4, at
383-86; Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1088-89
(1998).
Specifically addressing the United States Constitution, see Dow, supra note 14, at 119 (foot-
notes omitted):
In the United States, we believe in, and our political institutions reflect, majority rule.
At the same time, we also believe that not everything ought to be subject to it. Follow-
ing the majority because it is the majority is sometimes obligatory; resisting the majority
even though it is the majority is sometimes required. [These] [t]wo competing principles
constitute the essence of our political being.
See also id. at 136 ("The people may agree today that a mere majority tomorrow will lack the




A. Constitutional Precommitment and the Dead Hand Objection
An incisive expression of the so-called "dead hand" objection to
supermajority entrenchment of a constitutional provision4 is:
[I]f a present majority is bound by the constitutional handiwork of a
past majority until it can assemble the supermajority necessary to
secure constitutional change, [that situation] is inconsistent with the
democratic principle that present majorities rule themselves....
After the enacting generation has departed the scene, . . . any con-
stitutional provision is illegitimately entrenching.44
How much more so, then, for unamendable provisions?45
The dead hand objection was expressed during and even before
the founding of the United States and the framing of its Constitution.
Thomas Jefferson famously argued that the earth belongs to the living;
a constitution should expire after half of those who were adults at the
time of its introduction had died.46 His contemporaries Noah Webster
and Thomas Paine voiced similar ideas.47
43. The dead hand concern is expressed not only in terms of the supermajority requirement
for constitutional amendment. It also oftentimes is expressed as a critique of originalism as a
theory of interpreting the constitution, the idea being that originalism seeks to understand the
intent or meaning of those (almost always long dead) who wrote or ratified a constitutional
provision. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitu-
tion, 98 GEo. L. J. 1693, 1752 (2010) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Originalism].
44. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491, 508-09 (1997) [hereinafter Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review]; see also Issacharoff,
supra note 42, at 1987 ("[A] constitution ... is a precommitment that thwarts or limits delibera-
tive choices in the future."); McGinnis & Rappaport, Originalism, supra note 43, at 1752 ("The
dead hand problem refers to the question why, under the Constitution, the present day majority
is prevented from taking action that displaces the decisions of people long dead.").
45. "The strongest 'precommitment' device is a subject-matter restriction on formal amend-
ment." Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59 Mc-
GILL L.J. 225, 233 (2013) [hereinafter Albert, The Expressive Function]. And therefore: "the
dead hand problem is most acute with regard to so-called unamendable constitutional provi-
sions." Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review, supra note 44, at 508; see also Richard Albert,
Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J. 663, 667 (2010) [hereinafter Albert, Constitutional
Handcuffs] (noting unamendable constitutional provisions are "deeply troubling for democratic
theory, and doubly troubling for democratic practice"); id. at 675 (calling the denial of popular
choice brought about by unamendable provisions "another matter altogether" from the restric-
tions imposed by supermajority requirements for constitutional amendments).
46. Jefferson stated these views several times but perhaps related them most clearly in an
exchange of letters with James Madison. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302-05 (1999). Using actuarial tables from the time, Jefferson
determined that half of all then-existing adults would be dead in nineteen years and so suggested
that period of time as the natural lifespan for constitutional provisions. HOLMES, PASSION AND
CONsTRAINTS, supra note 42, at 142.
47. For short summaries of the views of Jefferson, Paine, and Webster, along with a rejoin-
der to Jefferson from Madison, see HOLMES, PASSION AND CONSTRAINTS, supra note 42, at
139-42, 152-58; Louis W. Hensler III, The Recurring Constitutional Convention: Therapy for a
Democratic Constitutional Republic Paralyzed by Hypocrisy, 7 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 263, 291-94
(2003); Pettys, supra note 6, at 326.
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Yet the grip of the dead hand and the resultant intergenerational
binding are, to some degree, unavoidable.4 8 The citizenry of a nation
is not a static "transtemporal national self,"4 9 and any act by the cur-
rent citizenry to bind itself will, as time passes, bind others who are
not yet part of the participating citizenry.s0 Even if we remove from
consideration the ongoing naturalization of citizens, on any given day
people are born into a citizenry, age into full political status, and die
out of the citizenry; generations do not change all at once. Today's
citizens are not identical to tomorrow's citizens, so a citizenry binding
itself begins immediately to bind a future, different citizenry.
But to restrict the present citizenry from binding itself also seems
unfair. By what right would future generations limit the present any-
more than vice versa? Must the citizenry of the present tiptoe
through the world in an effort not to do anything that will bind future
generations?52
48. "Unless a democratic system can solve the problem of representing the future, changing
interests of the unborn, it violates a rather fundamental underlying premise of democracy-that
those who bear the costs of a decision should have their interests adequately reflected in the
choice.... Aggregative democracy based on subjective political equality among current citizens
appears to be only a crude approximation to political equality." JAMES. G. MARCH & JOHAN P.
OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS 146-47 (1989).
49. Pettys, supra note 6, at 335 (using the term "transtemporal national self" and describing
the concept but considering the concept a failed rationale for originalist constitutional interpre-
tation). Under a theory of the citizenry as a "transtemporal national self," traceable at least as
far back as Richard Hooker and Edmund Burke, "governmental arrangements were an inheri-
tance that each new generation received from its predecessors" and the "[m]embers of a genera-
tion-spanning society are joined together as one body politic . . . so [that] one generation ...
binds it successors." Id. at 335-36. Some contemporary scholars have argued similarly in sup-
port of originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation. Id. at 336 (collecting examples).
50. Stephen Holmes, in the process of recounting and summarizing how James Madison and
David Hume reacted to Thomas Jefferson's assertions that every generation should start afresh
with a new constitution, puts the point perfectly:
Precisely because generations overlap, because individuals enter into and depart from
the world one by one, the living have no right to repeal, at set intervals, the legacy of
the past. Closing the doors on our predecessors' commitments is impractical, because
the members of every new generation must coexist promiscuously with survivors of the
old. . . . [The] methods of registering public consent [must] be compatible with the
unsynchronized itineraries of human lives.
HOLMES, PASSION AND CONSTRAINTS, supra note 42, at 158.
51. Seamless generations may be a reason to trust a commitment to constitutionalism: at
any given time, several generations have representatives in the citizenry (some who have been
adult citizens for 60 years and some who will still be citizens 60 years from now). See Pettys,
supra note 6, at 349-51.
52. "If this generation should not limit the capacity of future generations to make basic
political choices, by what authority can future generations restrict our choices about such mat-
ters? If our bodies must respect their ghosts, why do not their ghosts have the same obligation to
respect our bodies?" Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the
Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 164, 179 n.52 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995). Murphy concedes that, of course, "the specious present can inflict much more grievous
harm on the future than the future can inflict on the past." Id.
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The answer, then, is to bind the future as lightly as will simultane-
ously allow for full self-government of the present.53 There is "a dis-
tinction between majorities seeking to control themselves through
precommitment and seeking to control [the future] through
entrenchment."5 4
B. Lending a Helping (Dead) Hand
Once it is recognized that different generations affect one an-
other-and, of course, the temporal relationship between generations
cannot be changed-it is not surprising that different generations may
have different advantages and disadvantages. While the Framers may
have had more input into the Constitution, later generations have
other advantages. We inherit the benefits of their system-a Consti-
tution that is stable, desirable, and strongly supported by the nation."
Precommitment by one generation to constitutional provisions
that are difficult to amend can bring to future generations not only the
sovereignty-restraining dead hand but also benefits, precisely because
of the difficulty of amendment. "On this view, a constitutionally-
bound government acquires capacity it would not otherwise have by
effectively restraining itself . . . . A government which is effectively
bound to pay back its loans and honor its contracts is thereby made
better able to borrow money and enter into contracts."5 6
The key in the above quote is that the government is bound "ef-
fectively." That effectiveness comes from the difficulty in amending
the constitutional provisions requiring the repayment of loans and the
honoring of contracts.
The benefits flowing from the stability of the provisions en-
trenched in a constitution include the prevention of unwise
53. A majoritarian precommitment involves today's majority seeking to bind itself
against future temptations; cross-temporal entrenchment involves today's majority
seeking to control future majorities... . [C]onstitutionalism understood as intragenera-
tional precommitment may be justifiable on majoritarian grounds, . . . [b]ut constitu-
tionalism understood as the effort of current majorities (or even supermajorities) to
embed fundamental values against possible efforts by future generations to repudiate
them resists majoritarian justification.
Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review, supra note 44, at 507-08.
54. Id. at 507.
55. McGinnis & Rappaport, Originalism, supra note 43, at 1753.
56. John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEx. L. REV.
1929, 1929 (2003).
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majoritarian impulse; such impulse might otherwise violate minority
rights" or sacrifice important principles to short-term gain.58
Related to, but distinct from, the just-noted restraining features
of a difficult-to-change constitution, the stability of such an instrument
also encourages citizens to take the long view of their own accord and
to bypass short-term gains for ultimately more valuable benefits long
term.5 9 Knowing the rules are unlikely to change, repeat players have
an incentive to sacrifice the short term for the benefits of reciprocity,
reputation, and coordination.60 This long-view mentality can extend
even to the act of amendment, encouraging the generality of
provisions.6 '
The dead hand is usually discussed in terms of the restraint it ex-
erts on majorities, but such intergenerational constitutional commit-
ments also may enable that majoritarian power.62 A constitutional
57. Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, supra note 45, at 674 (noting the danger of "vicious
manifestations of majoritarianism" like German Nazism, South African apartheid, and the Jim
Crow laws in the United States).
58. "Constitutional designers may ... create formal amendment rules to limit [the] future
choices" of distrusted political actors. Albert, The Expressive Function, supra note 45, at 233; see
also ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 21, at 24-45 (analyzing the role of precommitment
in overcoming the change, or "time-inconsistency," of desires).
59. As to the benefits of the citizenry taking a long view, see Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment
and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARv. L. REV. 657, 711
(2011).
A constitution difficult to amend (and therefore one with provisions that endure for a long
time) "encourages a generality of perspective," leading to the formation of "reasonable ground
rules" and the creation of "liberty-bearing provisions ... in ignorance of many of the details of
social life to which they will come to be applied in the future." Lawrence G. Sager, The Birth
Logic of a Democratic Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 110,
123 (John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove & Jonathan Riley eds., 2001).
60. As to reciprocity and reputation, see Levinson, supra note 59, at 711; see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1122 (1998) (noting
that today's majority accepts limits on its power "for greater surety that its own rights will be
respected when. .. power has shifted"). As to coordination, see HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CON-
STRAINTS, supra note 42, at 172-74.
61. See Sager, supra note 59, at 124 (noting that when a constitution is "obdurate to
change," constitutional provisions may be "constrained to broad issues of structure and general
propositions of political justice").
Those who draft or are asked to ratify the content of an obdurate constitution are likely
to adopt a generosity or generality of perspective, born simply of the fact that they
know what they put in place is likely to remain in place. The narrow interests of an
individual or a group at the time of drafting or amendment is in competition with their
imaginable interests over time, and, for that matter, the interest of their children and
their children's children. Self-interest, projected over circumstances unknown and gen-
erations unborn, is likely to shed the worst of its parochial limitations.
Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 56, at 1958.
62. "[I]t is possible to view precommitments not so much as substantive limitations on the
choices of policy available to a majority at any particular point, but rather as the process values
that insure the rights of participation that are indispensable for any democratic order to survive."




framework can facilitate expression of majority will.63 A constitution
requiring a supermajority for amendment may settle, beyond repeated
majority oscillation, some basic issues which promote majoritarian
self-rule. For instance, durable constitutional provisions may (1) facil-
itate democracy through the settling of basic questions (e.g., parlia-
mentarian versus presidential form, federalist versus unitary, terms of
office, etc.), and (2) entrench some constitutional rights that enhance
democracy (e.g., free speech; one person, one vote; etc.).6 4
Finally, Stephen Holmes has noted an additional, somewhat indi-
rect benefit of one generations' restraint on future generations:
Precommitment is justified because, rather than merely foreclosing
options, it holds open possibilities that would otherwise lie beyond
reach. ... By means of a constitution, generation a can help genera-
tion c protect itself from being sold into slavery by generation b. To
safeguard the choices available to distant successors, constitution
makers restrict the choices available to proximate successors.65
C. Intergenerational Binding-Fair Terms
The previous sections in this Part tell us that for one generation
to bind other generations to constitutional provisions while mitigating
detriments (and maximizing benefits) to those later generations, it is
key that the self-interest of the present must be subordinated to a
view that all citizens, present and future, are worthy of equal concern.
Then the benefits of precommitment to well-chosen constitutional en-
trenchments can accrue: protected rights, enabled democracy, stabil-
ity-enhancing long view, and protection of far-future citizens from the
tyranny of intermediate generations.
One way to limit self-interest and provide intergenerational pro-
tection is for the earlier generation to (self-)impose a veil of igno-
rance. The term, "veil of ignorance" comes of course from John
"If the people cannot bind themselves, there can be neither a large-scale, peaceful, ordered
society nor any constitution that is authoritative beyond declaring that the will of the people is
the supreme law of the land." Murphy, supra note 52, at 187.
63. HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 42, at 167.
64. Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1637-38,
1640; see also HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 42, at 169-72; Albert, Unamend-
able, supra note 8, at 29-31; McGinnis & Rappaport, Originalism, supra note 43, at 1752 ("[A]
supermajoritarian-enacted constitution likely generates desirable restrictions like the separation
of powers, federalism, checks and balances, and the protection of individual rights. . . . Under
these conditions the hand of the past is one that reaches out to steady the living.").
65. HOLMES, PASSION AND CONSTRAINTS, supra note 42, at 162.
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Rawls.66 Adrian Vermeule has adapted Rawls's conception of the veil
of ignorance from one in which decision makers know the conse-
quences of their decisions but not what positions they will occupy, to
the more usual situation in which decision makers know the positions
they occupy, but are uncertain as to how benefits and burdens of their
decisions will be distributed.6 7 Vermeule defines: "[a] veil of igno-
rance rule . . . is a rule that suppresses elf-interested behavior on the
part of decisionmakers . . . by subjecting [them] to uncertainty about
the distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from a
decision."6 8
Vermeule offers four veiling tactics.69 The first is prospectivity,
which requires provisions be enacted in advance of the acts they gov-
ern; for instance, those creating a criminal provision do not know who
will violate the provision.o
The next two of Vermeule's tactics frequently work together.
Generality requires that provisions apply broadly, depriving those cre-
ating a provision of a strong predictive sense upon whom benefits and
burdens will disproportionately settle." Durability is roughly a tem-
poral version of the generality principle; it requires provisions be
likely to exist for a long time, so although those creating a provision
may have some idea of the short-term results it will have, the long-
term future introduces uncertainty as to the total effect of the provi-
sion.7 2 To be sure of creating an effective veiling, generality and dura-
66. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (1971).
67. Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399
(2001).
68. Id. at 399.
69. Id. at 407-08. Vermeule does add a fifth veil tactic, randomization, which he considers
"[a] straightforward means of producing a veil effect." He offers a short survey of scholarly
literature and historical practice, but notes randomization has rarely if ever been used in consti-
tutional governance. Id. at 424-25. This is not surprising, I suppose, given that we might prefer
government to act in a manner dictated by reason rather than chance. However, where a thing
must be done, and fairness dictates a given boon or burden be randomly assigned, it may pop up.
I offer two examples Vermeule did not mention in his piece, though that may be because he did
not consider them to be "constitutional governance." First, of course, is the example of a mili-
tary draft lottery. Second, and more likely to be considered both constitutional and governance,
is the division of the Senate into three classes, each to be elected every six years in cycling two-
year intervals. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, sec. 3, cl. 2. The original division of the first twenty
senators was made by lot on May 15, 1789. S. JOURNAL, Ist Cong., 1st Sess., May 15, 1789. As
later states were added, the Senate used lots again to determine which of each state's two new
senators was in which class. See e.g., S. JOURNAL, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 617 (1850) (noting the
manner in which California's two new senators, John C. Fr6mont and William M. Gwin, were
assigned to senatorial classes).
70. Id. at 408-11.
71. Id. at 412.
72. Id. at 415.
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bility may need to be tied together (and would ideally be so tied) so
that, should those creating a provision burden a general group to
which the creators do not belong, they still cannot be sure they will
not enter that group in the future."
Vermeule's fourth veil tactic is delayed effectiveness, which un-
couples the decision from short-term interests by lengthening the time
between the decision to enact the provision and the provision taking
effect.74 This eliminates situations in which a short-term gain is so big
it would swamp the self-interest-defeating properties of durable provi-
sions.7 5 Delayed (or "sunrise") provisions also present a moral diffi-
culty, however: the reduced interest of the present-day designers of
the constitutional provisions comes about precisely because it will not
affect those in the present as much as those in the future; so the pre-
sent is constitutionalizing more for the future than for itself, which
exacerbates the problem of the dead hand.
Combining generality, durability and delayed effectiveness
(which by its nature includes prospectivity) produces a veil of suffi-
cient thickness to limit significantly the self-interest of those imposing
a constitutional provision. Generality suggests the substance that a
constitutional provision should have if it is to be resistant to self-inter-
est of its framers; durability and delayed effectiveness suggest the
manner of implementation that will best limit self-interest in the
framers.
There are two more criteria, neither of them veil tactics and both
of them procedural, to be added to our list of best practices for engag-
ing in intergenerational binding. Symmetric entrenchment describes
the concept that "[e]ach generation should be subject to the same
73. Vermeule, supra note 67, at 417.
74. Id. at 419. Jon Elster has expressed similar ideas as to the value of delay in reducing
self-interest in those creating constitutional provisions. ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note
21, at 143-46. Elster suggested a delay of ten or twenty years. Id. at 144. Elster also recognized
that delays could be used to get decision makers to commit to a plan when the long-term benefits
are known to be better than the short-term return, and then follow through later despite any
instances when the short-term gain of backing out may temporarily be greater than the short-
term gain of sticking it out. Id. at 141, 143.
For more on delayed implementation of laws and constitutional provisions, see generally
Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not Yet: Sunrise
Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975 (2015) (exploring the use
of sunrise lawmaking in the United States); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and
Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543 (2007) (discussing various rules for forcing delay in
legislative lawmaking).
75. Vermeule, supra note 67, at 419.
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rules for adding constitutional provisions as the other generations."7 6
Basic fairness between those framing a provision and those who will
later live with the provision dictates there should be a "strong pre-
sumption" that "[t]he voting rule that governs the enactment of an
entrenched provision should be the same as the voting rule governing
its repeal."" At the original framing of an entire constitution, it may
be necessary to entrench some basic compromises more deeply than
the rest of the constitutional provisions, but "[o]nce a constitution is
up and running, it is much harder to overcome the presumption of
symmetry. "
Richard Albert suggests intertemporality as a requirement for en-
trenchment of especially important provisions.7 9 Intertemporality
"respect[s] the considered judgment of the community as expressed
over a period of years, and not only at one fixed point in time" and
can be executed by "sequential approval-multiple votes over multi-
ple years."so
Intertemporality reflects the view that
[s]upermajorities are not created equal: their strength is directly
proportional to their stability over time. A sustainable
supermajority thus has a greater claim to representativeness than a
temporary one. What underpins this view is a theory of transcen-
dent sovereignty that assigns to some combination of previous, pre-
sent, and future political actors-rather than only to the present
76. McGinnis & Rappaport, Originalism, supra note 43, at 1719; see also McGinnis & Rap-
paport, Symmetric, supra note 22, at 385.
77. McGinnis & Rappaport, Symmetric, supra note 22, at 426. "[S]ymmetric entrenchment
treats all generations fairly, because they give each generation an equal opportunity to enact and
repeal entrenched provisions." Id. This means any change in the procedural rules, including the
size of the supermajority needed to adopt an amendment, can never be changed, as any such
change (e.g., ratifying by three-fourths of the states an amendment proposal to change the re-
quirement to nine-tenths of the states) would be asymmetric.
78. Id. at 430; see also Albert, The Expressive Function, supra note 45, at 245 ("[Tlhe choice
to make one constitutional provision subject to a higher formal amendment threshold could
represent a political bargain entered into by the constitutional designers for the sake of ratifying
an otherwise 'unratifiable' constitution."). Cf Sager, supra note 59, at 113 (arguing "[w]e need
to set aside the clearly false idea that there is a necessary symmetry between conditions under
which a regime of government is born and those under which it can be changed or replaced.").
79. Albert, Amendment Rules, supra note 7, at 22. Albert offers intertemporality as a strat-
egy for the entrenchment of a constitution's amending provisions, but the concept is a perfect fit
for thinking about intergenerational binding. Albert also suggests relativity, the scaling of provi-
sions by how difficult they are to amend. Id. I do not discuss relativity because, in the end, I will
be asking what processes are best used for unamendable provisions, a situation in which the




generation-the shared responsibility for ratifying transformative
change.8 1
As Albert notes,8 2 this is an expression of Jed Rubenfeld's theory
of "how a constitution binds-of how, in other words, constitutional
law exerts legitimate authority over time."" Rubenfeld argues that
people "live through temporally extended courses of action. . . . Self-
government therefore requires that the self simultaneously be gov-
erning and governed. This is attainable only by one who lives out self-
given commitments."8 4 The appropriate "self" for democratic self-
government is "a people"8 ; so "the very idea of a nation, of a national
people as a subject of self-government, contemplates an entity that
extends across generations."" In Rubenfeld's view, then, "[w]ritten
self-government ... demands the creation of new constitutional com-
mitments only when a people is prepared to make a significant tempo-
ral commitment to them.""
Thus, Albert's intertemporality scheme binds temporally proxi-
mate generations together in constitution-making; the later generation
has veto power over whether the earlier generation's suggestion be-
comes a binding constitutional provision. This has the effect of al-
lowing, at least for roughly adjacent generations, an almost magical
reversal of time's arrow. It also requires the proposing generation to
believe the provision is a good idea even if it will not have an immedi-
ate effect on that generation.8 8
D. Application to Unamendability
One might consider unamendability, the placing of a position be-
yond any supermajority's ability to alter, to be a facially illegitimate
imposition of one generation's will upon future generations8 9-it is
81. Id. at 23.
82. Id. at 24 (citing JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001)).
83. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 163 (2001).
84. Id. at 143.
85. Id. at 145.
86. Id. at 152.
87. Id. at 175.
88. Depending on the length of the delay, the effect on the propsing generation could be
extremely attenuated.
89. See Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPER-
FECTION 91 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) ("Could a legitimate amendment generally purport to
make itself (or any other random provision of the Constitution) immune from further amend-
ments? If so, wouldn't that clearly violate the legal right of future generations to alter their
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the dead hand with a vengeance. Unamendability certainly violates
the directive that the present should tread lightly on the sovereignty of
the future.90
Under Jed Rubenfeld's theory of constitutionalism noted earlier,
[t]he very principle that gives the Constitution legitimate author-
ity-the principle of self-government over time-requires that a na-
tion be able to reject any part of a constitution whose commitments
are no longer the people's own. Thus written constitutionalism re-
quires a process not only of popular constitution-writing, but also of
popular constitution-rewriting.91
Others have cautioned that unamendable provisions forestall the
possibly valuable act of continually choosing, regardless of the choice
being for good or ill. 92 Unamendable provisions could "chill constitu-
tional discourse and prevent reconsideration of the constitutional
text," 93 and can, because there is no safety valve of amendment, lead
to extra-constitutional change or revolution.9 4
Other problems exist as well. Unamendability introduces a spe-
cial separation of powers problem in that court interpretations of the
text of unamendable provisions cannot be undone by amendment.9 5
And, of course, symmetry, of the sort in which the enacted provision is
repealable by the same supermajority, is impossible where the provi-
sion is unamendable.
Finally, when we consider the United States Constitution's his-
tory with unamendability, we are hardly encouraged. Unamendablity
has been used once to protect the right of a member of any religion to
serve in the United States government and multiple times to entrench
or attempt to entrench slavery.96
government?"); Murphy, supra note 52, at 178-79 (considering the argument that "a people
could not legitimately use democratic processes to destroy the essence of democracy-the right
of others, either of a current majority or minority or of a minority of future generations, to
meaningful participation in self-government.") (footnotes omitted).
90. Albert, Unamendable, supra note 8, at 23 (noting his understanding that "democratic
constitutionalism . . . require[s] the continuing right of political actors and citizens to redefine
themselves through their constitution"); Issacharoff, supra note 42, at 199; (noting that one can
debate the relation of increased costs to concomitant benefits attending a hard-to-amend consti-
tution; but unamendability is, in those terms, an infinite cost).
91. RUBENFELD, supra note 82, at 174.
92. Albert, Unamendable, supra note 8, at 28.
93. Albert, Counterconstitutionalism, supra note 9, at 47 (2008); see also Albert, Unamend-
able, supra note 8, at 24.
94. Albert, Counterconstitutionalism, supra note 9, at 51.
95. Albert, Unamendable, supra note 8, at 24.
96. See supra notes 28-31, 36-37 and accompanying text.
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What can be said to justify unamendable provisions against all of
those detriments?
First, we should note that several of the objections just listed have
to do with the risk of choosing unwisely what to make unamendable.
That is of course a valid and significant concern; but it also is a con-
cern that can be dealt with separately from the argument that
unamendability, of itself, is somehow harmful to a citizenry.97
Second, recalling the benefits noted in Part II.B., we can see
unamendability has a number of things to recommend it in the face of
concerns about its inherent nature to irrevocably bind future genera-
tions. Unamendable provisions provide maximum stability and per-
manent settling of basic questions, enabling all of the benefits
associated with reliance. They also provide maximum restraint on any
impulsive, destructive passions of majorities and even supermajorities.
And if carefully written, unamendable provisions may be the most ef-
fective means of preventing future generations from harming even
later generations.
III. THE FRAMERS' BEQUEST(S) AND OUR
FUTURE(S) AS HEIR
If we assume I am right that the original Constitution had (and
has) an unamendable provision, but we leave undecided the question
of whether unamendable provisions can be added by amendment,
there are four possible situations:
(1) The framing generation created unamendable provisions but we
do not have the power to do the same.
(2) The framing generation created unamendable provisions; we
have the power to create unamendable provisions; and we create
exactly one: a provision that unamendably abjures the power of the
citizenry ever to create another unamendable provision.
(3) The framing generation created unamendable provisions; we
have the power to create unamendable provisions; and we do so,
but not of the type noted in (2). The Constitution retains the power
to create more unamendable provisions in the future (including,
possibly, eventually, an amendment that bars all future unamend-
able provisions).
(4) The framing generation created unamendable provisions; we
have the power to create unamendable provisions; and we neither
97. Below, I offer strategies to improve the likelihood that unamendable provisions will be
chosen well. See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
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create them nor prohibit them. This has been the situation since the
original Constitution was ratified.
Note that in every instance the framing generation has set itself
apart as unique. The framing generation decided to include unamend-
able provisions, and by doing so spoke in a way that prevents any
future generation from speaking on the topic of religious tests (and,
temporarily, on various other aspects of the Constitution).9 8
A. They the People
Unlike other futures I listed above and discuss below, this one is
not the result of a choice we make. Rather, this future assumes, con-
trary to my argument above,99 the framing generation has prohibited
all future unamendable provisions.100 We cannot undo that choice.
Thus, we are not "We the People" of the Constitution's Preamble,
rather, the Framers are "They the People" and we are "Their
Posterity."
The prohibition on unamendable provisions may be a good thing,
normatively. The Framers' decision prevents irrepealable mistakes
and prevents any generation's infliction of irrevocable binding on a
later generation. Still, it feels a bit like being set loose in the Garden
of Eden and being told to avoid the Tree of Knowledge
Unamendability. There is something patronizing about being told by
the Framers that certain compromises were necessary to the formation
of the Constitution but the similar ability to bind a bargain so long as
the Constitution exists is not available to us.
B. Forever and Ever Amen[d]
If we can create unamendable provisions, one possible choice is
to prohibit forever any future unamendable provisions.
101 The No
Religious Test Clause will remain unamendable but that will be the
98. The framing generation was unique, too, in that it set the rules for amendment-what
processes must be followed and the sizes of the supermajorities necessary to propose and ratify a
constitutional amendment. But that aspect of the framers' uniqueness was unavoidable. The
framers needed to decide how, at least originally, the amending process was to function. The
decision to set a few things outside that process, though, is different because while later genera-
tions could change the amending process, later generations cannot undo an unamendable
provision.
99. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. See also Mader, supra note 10 at 878-89.
100. Referring to Tables 1 & 2, this places the Constitution in Box 1B, from which no move-
ment is possible.
101. Referring to Tables 1 & 2, this is a movement from Box 3 to Box 1B.
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only unamendable provision for as long as the Constitution exists. In
this future, "we un-lock the door and throw away the key[.]" 1 0 2
On the one hand, this might seem an attractive option. We avoid
making mistakes we (and future generations) cannot reverse. There
also is a certain fairness in that the limit we impose applies to our-
selves as surely as to future generations.
Still, we engage in a certain egotism: if we do abjure forever the
power to create unamendable provisions, it is a choice we make for
the future as well as ourselves. A citizenry should bind future genera-
tions as little as possible, and in this scenario we would be removing
from future generations the power to unalterably bind themselves.
The power to bind oneself is no small thing to be without. Should
a future situation require a compromise that all sides needed to be
sure was binding beyond possibility of amendment, there would be no
such device available. Just as with any other unamendable provision
(see Section C, below), taking the irrevocable action of prohibiting all
future unamendable provisions should be done with a mindfulness,
and perhaps also the consent, of future citizens.
Additionally, what would it mean for us to send the nation irre-
versibly into a future in which everything (save the No Religious Test
Provision) is officially impermanent, where the Constitution's chief
feature is its own changeability?1 0 3
One reasonable approach, should we choose to go down this
road, would be to temporarily give up the right to create unamendable
provisions. We could amend the Constitution to include a provision
prohibiting for say, ten years, the enactment of unamendable provi-
102. Mader, supra note 10, at 889.
103. See David Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: Schneid-
erman v. United States, 35 CONN. L. REv. 35, 35, 42-47 (2002) (discussing a case in which the
court adjudicated whether a naturalized citizen, in order to prove he was "attached to the princi-
ples of the Constitution," as required to obtain citizenship, must consider some aspects of the
Constitution to be unamendable); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 126-28,
135-38, 142-47 (1988) (discussing "constitutional attachment" in general and Schneiderman
specifically).
In a story repeated in several sources, the famous mathematician and logician Kurt Gadel,
when he applied for U.S. citizenship, is reported to have stated he knew how the United States,
without violation of its constitution, could become a dictatorial state; his reasoning is unknown,
but some commentators have concluded his conclusion was based on his understanding that
there were no limits on amendment in the Constitution. See SUBER, supra note 21, at 212; F. E.
Guerra-Pujol, Gddel's Loophole, 41 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 637 (2013); Sanford Levinson & Jack
M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 750-52 (2009).
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sions.1 0 4 Such a temporary restraint would both spur discussion of the
question and also allow time for the near future to make a considered
judgment on the matter. Such a temporary moratorium, whether it
results in a permanent disavowal of unamendable provisions or in one
of the other scenarios below, may be a good place to start.
C. Finding Our Voice and Having Our Say
Another choice we can make is to add one or more unamendable
provisions to the Constitution. We have as much right as any genera-
tion, including the Framers, to speak an unamendable truth.0 5 The
dead hand objection expresses a concern that a given generation not
needlessly inhibit majoritarian democracy in future generations,10 6 but
in trying to preserve every possible voice of constitutional amendment
in the future, might we unduly silence ourselves? If we are to speak,
what should we say, and how best do we to temper that speech before
we make it permanent?
As to substance, in an effort to cabin the conversation and to bet-
ter choose from tested ideas, I will focus on which current United
States Constitutional provisions are good choices for an upgrade to
status as unamendable provisions.o- Certainly it seems that the pro-
hibition on slavery,108 and the prohibitions on denying a right to vote
based on race109 or sex,110 are the sorts of provisions that might be
made unamendable without significant fear of later regret.
104. If we wanted to guarantee the ten years, then similarly to the U.S. Constitution's Sunset
Entrenchment Provision mentioned supra in II.B., this amendment itself would need to be
unamendable for the same period of time.
105. The framing generation had no special merit that of itself renders their work special
status beyond their coming first. See Pettys, supra note 6, at 327-29 (illustrating that, as a re-
sponse to the dead-hand objection to originalism as a method of interpreting the Constitution,
there are significant problems with the argument that the framers were wiser and less self-inter-
ested than later generations); Weis, supra note 5, at 256-57 (disputing the often-made argument
that "A constitution's founding is often thought to uniquely locate popular sovereignty as the
source of constitutionalism. . . 'founding moments' represent episodes of intense public deliber-
ation and engagement hat are not found in everyday politics").
106. An additional normative problem with this scenario is if we follow up our creation of
unamendable provisions by moving to scenario (2) and prohibiting all future unamendable pro-
visions. In that case, we have become for future generations what, in scenario (1), the framing
generation is to us.
107. We certainly could look at examples from other countries, though the reasons for those
provisions being unamendable vary as widely as the geography, peoples, and political histories of
those nations. See, e.g., Albert, Constitutional Disuse, supra note 9, at 1039-40, 1038 nn.53-57,
1040 nn.67-68. Among his copious work on unamendability, Professor Albert has categorized
unamendable provisions by their purpose. See Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, supra note 45,
at 678-98 (listing preservative, transformational, and reconciliatory unamendable provisions).
108. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
109. Id. amend. XV, § 1.
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If we examine these three gold-standard provisions and see what
attributes they have in common, we can generalize to the sorts of pro-
visions especially likely to make good choices for unamendability. (1)
They are tried and true in the extreme, all having been present in our
constitutional system for about 100 to 150 years; (2) all of them are
general in application-they apply to everyone; (3) all are aimed at
stopping harm to individuals without imposing a similar harm on any-
one else; and (4) they express ideas that can be reasonably captured in
language, especially in that they contain straightforward prohibi-
tions."'1 These attributes are what we might look for in fashioning
other candidates for unamendability.
Commentators addressing unamendability have put forward the
democratic speech rights of the First Amendment as candidates for
permanent entrenchment in the Constitution,1 1 2 but I think the ideas
expressed in the First Amendment are simply too cognitively thick to
be made unamendable at this time. Court interpretation of unamend-
able provisions will be impervious to alteration by constitutional
amendment, so such provisions must be straightforward. First
Amendment provisions must somehow be narrowed and specified
before they are made unamendable.
Applying special processes and/or limitations might be one way
to work toward making unamendable some of the First Amendment
protections. We might try making a provision temporarily unamend-
able. This would "relax[ ] the dead hand['s grip]" on future genera-
tions when the provision expires.' Combining temporary
110. Id. amend. XIX.
111. Clear and focused language is necessary to avoid the problem of a Supreme Court opin-
ion permanently inserting a problematic interpretation into the Constitution. See Albert,
Unamendable, supra note 8, at 24. Yes, there may be reasonable debate as to all the possible
meanings of sex, or race, or slavery, or voting, or even denial, but the idea is fairly concrete when
compared to terms like "due process," "privilege," "speech," or "commerce."
112. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 16 (1991) (stating "I myself
think it would be a good idea to entrench the Bill of Rights against subsequent revision by some
future American majority caught up in some awful neo-Nazi paroxysm."); id at 320-21, (discuss-
ing the German constitution's unamendable provisions guaranteeing basic human dignity, and
positing the possible value of entrenching rights unamendably into the United States Constitu-
tion); see also Albert, Unamendable, supra note 8, at 31 (expressing a belief that "the First
Amendment's democratic rights must themselves be unamendable in order to preserve the free
amendability of the United Sates Constitution"); Galston, supra note 13, at 114-15 (arguing that
unamendably entrenching First Amendment values, for instance, might bring out the "enabling"
benefits discussed earlier, as those values could "reinforce[ ] popular sovereignty (by preserving]
the fundamental values that prevent the popular will from actions that could undermine popular
government").
113. Ozan 0. Varol, Temporary Constitutions, 102 CAL. L. REV. 409, 448-52 (2014). Varol is
not addressing unamendable provisions, but Varol's thorough discussion of the virtues and flaws
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unamendability with Albert's prescription of sequential approvals in
accordance with the principle of intertemporality,114 we would have a
situation in which we expand the base of those consulted and impose
the unalterability of the provision on only those citizens most proxi-
mate to the action. Perhaps, by episodic trials and tweaks, something
even so rich in meaning as the First Amendment might be rendered
into provisions as surely perpetually desirable as the three provisions
mentioned earlier.
Sunset unamendability combined with intertemporality may be
wise in almost any instance of unamendability. Such provisions allow
us to restrain ourselves, with spillover effect into only the near future.
Where a provision proves desirable over time, it may be re-en-
trenched over and over, if the then-present citizens desire it, allowing
some provisions to be ever on a continually receding horizon.
Where we are considering pronouncing perpetual truths meant to
bind future generations to the lessons we have learned, we should
avail ourselves of a design and assessment protocol that includes se-
quential approval over time and perhaps an incubation period during
which we have temporary provisions before committing to perpetuity.
D. Holding Our Tongue
We also can leave to our later selves and to future generations the
decision of whether to create unamendable provisions or ban them
forever. No generation of citizens since the framing has created an
unamendable provision, and no one has seriously tried since 1861. We
can simply refrain as well. This stance preserves options. From here,
we or future citizens can adopt either of the futures mapped out in B
and C above.
I am convinced that any unamendable provisions, even one bar-
ring other unamendable provisions, should be the result of a process
that forces a careful consideration of the magnitude and propriety of
such an act. I therefore distill four principles from the foregoing
discussion.
(1) Due concern for the sovereignty of future generations over
their own times, no unamendable provision should be truly perma-
of temporary constitutional provisions offers several ideas that are helpful when thinking about
the difficulty of safely creating unamendable provisions.
114. See Albert, Amendment Rules, supra note 7, at 678-81.
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nent; any unamendable provision should sunset by its own terms after
a period of time.
(2) To merely state a special case of (1), even those provisions
that designate the disallowance of unamendable provisions should be
temporary. A constitutional provision declaring that unamendable
provisions are banned must have a beginning and ending date.
(3) Where an unamendable provision is substantive (that is, it ad-
dresses anything other than solely the turning on or off of the power
to create unamendable provisions-the sorts of provisions just noted
in (2)), it should have a delayed onset. This delayed onset should also
require a second ratification of the provision after a significant period
of time, the better to allow: (a) a span of time during which any mis-
taken supermajoritarian fervor for the provision can die down, al-
lowing sober, careful thought about the wisdom of both the provision
and its unamendability; and (b) acknowledgment of the intertemporal
binding of generations. Combined with (1), this means any substan-
tive unamendable provision must have a delayed, doubly approved
sunrise AND a sunset.
(4) As a first step, I recommend an amendment that would place
a temporary moratorium on unamendable provisions. Such an
amendment proposal itself would begin a discussion about unamend-
able provisions, and its ratification would allow time for such a discus-
sion to play out in an atmosphere free from any impending permanent
provision.
CONCLUSION
In the late 1780s, "We the People" wrote and ratified the United
States Constitution. The original Constitution included an unamend-
able provision but offered no explicit guidance as to whether future
unamendable provisions might be created. The answer to the ques-
tion of whether we can now create unamendable provisions has
profound ramifications for the relationships among generations of
U.S. citizens. This Article explores the possible answers.
The results are discomfiting. If we don't have the power, then we
must admit there is a profound discontinuity in the power exerted by
those ratifying the Constitution and those, like us, who come after.
Assuming we do have the power to create unamendable provisions,
we have three options: create them, stop them forever, or leave the
possibility open, but refrain from doing anything at the moment. Bar-
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ring forever the creation of new unamendable provisions is appealing
as a safety measure against unwise amendments, but denies us the
power to bind ourselves to tenets we may wish to adopt. Creating an
unamendable provision, even leaving that option open for ourselves
or another generation may seem risky, but we can discern guidelines
for creating unamendable provisions that offer a degree of security.
Those guidelines include: requiring multiple ratifications spread over
time; making the unamendability temporary; and writing the amend-
ment with clear, simple terms.
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